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Abstract 
Literature on influence operations has identified metrics that are indicative of social media 
manipulation, but few studies have explored the lifecycle of low-quality information. We 
contribute to this literature by reconstructing nearly 3M messages posted by 1M users in the last 
days of the Brexit referendum campaign. While previous studies have found that on average only 
4% of tweets disappear, we found that 33% of the tweets leading up to the referendum vote are 
no longer available. Only about half of the most active accounts that tweeted the referendum 
continue to operate publicly and 20% of all accounts are no longer active. We tested whether 
partisan content was more likely to disappear and found more messages from the Leave 
campaign that disappeared than the entire universe of tweets affiliated with the Remain 
campaign. We compare these results with a set of 45 hashtags posted in the same period and find 
that political campaigns present much higher ratios of user and tweet decay. These results are 
validated by inspecting 2M Brexit-related tweets posted over a period of nearly 4 years. The 
article concludes with an overview of these findings and recommendations for future research. 
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Highlights 
• 33% of the tweets leading up to the referendum vote have been removed 
• Only about half of the most active accounts that tweeted the referendum continue to operate 
publicly 
• 20% of the accounts are no longer active and 20% of these accounts were blocked by Twitter 
• While Twitter suspended fewer than 5% of all accounts, they posted nearly 10% of the entire 
conversation about the referendum 
• There are more messages from the Leave campaign that have disappeared than the entire 
universe of tweets affiliated with the Remain campaign 
Introduction 
The backdrop of influence operations and social media manipulation that emerged during key 
electoral events in 2016 constitute a challenge that policymakers and researchers continue to 
grapple (Bastos & Mercea, 2019; Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, 2017; Weedon, Nuland, & 
Stamos, 2017). The open infrastructure of social platforms, whence the cornerstone of networked 
publics, has rapidly evolved into increasingly opaque social infrastructures largely unaccountable 
to the public. While the effectiveness of influence operations is crucially dependent on social 
tensions and biases that can be exploited with divisive information, the relatively sudden 
emergence of this ecosystem of information warfare is equally reliant on the attention economy 
and the social media supply chain underlying social platform’s business model (Walker, Mercea, 
& Bastos, 2019). 
 Social media platforms have ramped up efforts to flag false amplification (Weedon et al., 2017), 
remove “fake accounts” (Twitter, 2018b), and prevent the use of highly optimized and targeted 
political messages on users (Dorsey, 2019). These efforts sought to clear social platforms from 
“low-quality content,” a broad definition including user accounts, posts, and weblinks to content 
selected for removal. The removal of user accounts and posts constitutes an important line of 
action social platforms undertake in their struggle against influence operations, misinformation, 
false or fabricated news items, spam, and user-generated hyperpartisan news, with Twitter being 
the most effective platform at countering manipulation by identifying and removing more 
inauthentic behavior (Bay & Fredheim, 2019). Along with Facebook, Twitter is also the only 
platform that publicly released the community standards defining “problematic content” and the 
process through which such policies are enforced (Facebook, 2018a, 2018b; Twitter, 2019b). 
 
The large-scale removal of social media content has the problematic disadvantage of altering the 
record of social interactions. Unlike traditional media used to distribute propaganda, such as 
newspapers and posters in the 20th century (Sanders & Taylor, 1982), or pamphlets and leaflets 
going back as far as the 16th century (Raymond, 2003), the removal of social media content 
eliminates any trace of the event necessary for sociologists, let alone historians, to investigate 
strategies of contemporary influence operations. While there have been attempts to create public 
archives of social media posts, these institutional efforts faced considerable challenges and failed 
to come to fruition (Zimmer, 2015). Similarly, although social platforms have at times offered 
archives of disinformation campaigns identified and removed by the very platforms (Elections 
Integrity, 2018), such sanctioned archives offer only a partial glimpse into the extent of influence 
operations and may prevent researchers from examining organic contexts of manipulation (Acker 
& Donovan, 2019). 
 
Indeed, influence operations on social platforms, particularly on Facebook and Twitter, continue 
to rely on coordinated and targeted attacks where the accounts and profiles sourcing the content 
disappear in the months following the campaign. Some accounts are suspended by the social 
platforms for violating standards and Terms of Service (Gleicher, 2019), such as posting 
inappropriate content or displaying bot-like activity patterns; others are deleted by the malicious 
account holders reportedly to cover their tracks (Owen, 2019). The modus operandi of influence 
operations often consists of amplifying original hyperpartisan content by large botnets that 
disappear after the campaign. The emerging thread is then picked up by high-profile partisan 
accounts that seed divisive rhetoric to larger networks of partisan users and automated accounts 
(Bastos & Mercea, 2019). 
 
Unfortunately no study has systematically analyzed the fraction of deleted tweets during political 
events, nor how partisan content differs from the nonpolitical content relative to the fraction of 
deleted content in the period that follows the campaign, To address this gap in the literature, we 
revisit a large data set of three million tweets posted in the period leading up to the 2016 United 
Kingdom European Union membership referendum to quantify the extent to which partisan and 
non-partisan communication related to the referendum is still available. We compare these 
figures with a range of data sets also recorded in 2016 and to a larger database of Brexit-related 
tweets encompassing nearly four years of Twitter activity.  
Previous work 
There is a large body of scholarship exploring the transformative potential of social platforms to 
complement or substitute deliberative forums supporting civic participation, particularly with 
respect to access to information, reciprocity of communication, and commercialization of online 
space (Malina, 2005; Papacharissi, 2002). This scholarship pays tribute to the Habermasian 
concept of the public sphere, identifying the internet with domains of social life where public 
opinion could be expressed, and often praising digital communication as a force for 
democratization and deliberation (Davis, Elin, & Reeher, 2002). The underlying assumption was 
that social media would offer the public accord―and perhaps more critically, a public 
record―of the decision making process underpinning rational deliberation (Papacharissi, 2008). 
Yet, only limited empirical work has been carried out on the use of social platforms as archives 
supporting a healthy public sphere (Mylonas, 2017). 
 
The process of verifying whether a social media post remains available after being posted online 
can be made via http requests or programmatically using social platform’s application 
programming interface (API). Twitter allows developers to retrieve programmatically and at 
scale (i.e., “rehydrate”) the full tweet, user profile, or direct message content using their APIs 
(Twitter, 2019a), but their Terms of Service state that content deleted by a user or blocked by the 
platform due to infringements on the ToS ought to disappear from the platform altogether; 
similarly, deleting a tweet automatically triggers a cascade of deletions for all retweets of that 
tweet (Twitter, 2018a). This specific affordance of social platforms has of course facilitated the 
disappearance of posts, images, and weblinks from the public view, with important and negative 
effects to research on influence operations. 
 
Social platforms rarely disclose content that was flagged for removal, and therefore studying the 
politics of deletion on social platforms is an exercise in reverse engineering. Conversely, content 
that has been deleted or blocked from social platforms is likely to fall within the broad category 
of “low quality content,” and we hypothesize that content decay―tweet and user decay in the 
context of Twitter―can be used as proxies to examine the extent to which deliberation on social 
media is hindered by strategic information operations, including disinformation and other forms 
of problematic content (Starbird, Arif, & Wilson, 2019; Starbird, Maddock, Orand, Achterman, 
& Mason, 2014). Indeed, previous research has found that hyperpartisan content is marked by a 
short shelf life, disappearing or significantly changing shortly after being posted online (Bastos 
& Mercea, 2019), an indication of the perishable nature of digital content at the center of 
political deliberation (Walker, 2015). 
 
There is surprisingly little research on how social media data sets change when observed at 
different points in time and how this may impact the results of the analysis. Walker (2015) 
contrasted data collected from social media platforms in real-time versus data collected minutes, 
hours, or days after the post went online. McCreadie et al. (2012) explored the effect of this 
collection decay on the Tweets2011 data, a set of 16 million tweets offered by Twitter and made 
available to participants of the TREC Conference. The data set, whose tweets cover the period of 
January 23 to February 8, 2011, was reconstructed using an asynchronous HTTP fetcher (as 
opposed to Twitter APIs) in 2012. Given the limitations and the unreliability of HTTP crawlers, 
no precise information was given regarding the ratio of tweets that disappeared within the one-
year gap between the data being made available and the reconstruction of the data set. 
 Bagdouri and Oard (2015) also developed an evaluation design to predict whether a tweet will be 
deleted within the first 24 of being posted. The classifier, which takes into account the 
distribution of deleted tweets, along with tweet-based and user-based features, reported a very 
sharp skew in the data, with some users regularly deleting their tweets while others would rarely 
do so. Bagdouri and Oard (2015) also found that the most prolific deleters were automated 
systems engaging in advertisement, a known marker of spambots that push low-quality content 
and are ultimately purged from social platforms. More interestingly, Bagdouri and Oard (2015) 
reported a remarkably low ratio of tweet decay in the 24h period, with only 3.6% of the 
messages having been deleted, or 2.2% of the data once retweets were excluded. Finally, they 
reported that 2% of users were responsible for just above one third of all deletions that were not 
of retweets. 
 
In related research, Xu, Burchfiel, Zhu, and Bellmore (2013) collected a corpus of over 300 
thousand bullying-related tweets and estimated the survival rate by querying the URL of the 
tweet for around two months at regular intervals. The deletion rate found in the data, 
hypothesized to be a function of user’s regret, allowed the construction of a “regrettable posts 
predictor.” Deletion rate was found to decay over time, with a drop-off in deletion rate that was 
so extreme that the authors could safely exclude deletions occurring after two weeks from the 
filtered data set without significantly introducing any noise. In the end, the overall fraction of 
deleted tweets was rather low and similar to those reported by Bagdouri and Oard (2015), at 
3.75%. This fraction of deleted tweets of 4% is considerably lower than what we have 
anecdotally observed in a range of political and protest data sets.  
 
We seek to contribute to this literature by calculating the fraction of deleted tweets and accounts 
in a large data set of 3 million tweets posted in the period leading up to the 2016 United 
Kingdom European Union membership referendum. Given the polarized and highly partisan 
nature of the campaign, we hypothesize that (H1) the fraction of deleted tweets will be higher 
than the 4% reported in the literature. We also hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, (H2) highly 
partisan messages will present higher decay compared with neutral messages. We validate the 
tests of H1 and H2 against a range of hashtags that also emerged in 2016, and finally to a larger 
database of Brexit-related tweets encompassing nearly four years of Twitter activity. Given the 
relatively long period of time under analysis, and that deletions seem largely concentrated in the 
24h of the post going online (Bagdouri & Oard, 2015; Xu et al., 2013), we expect the occurrence 
of significant political events to affect tweet decay and hypothesize that (H3) tweet decay will be 
associated with the emergence of significant political events. 
Data and Methods 
We relied on Twitter’s Streaming and REST APIs, two of the endpoints offered by Twitter to 
programmatically collect data, to amass three key databases explored in this study: pre-Brexit, 
post-Brexit, and non-Brexit data sets. The pre-Brexit data set includes a total of 8,821,116 tweets 
collected using a set of keywords and hashtags, including relatively neutral tags (e.g., 
referendum, inorout, and euref), hashtags supporting the Leave campaign (e.g., voteleave, 
leaveeu, takecontrol, voteout, and beleave), and tags clearly aligned with the Remain campaign 
(e.g., strongerin, leadnotleave, voteremain, moreincommon, and lovenotleave). The hashtags 
were parsed across multiple querying pools to avoid API filtering. Queries that exceeded the 
one-percent threshold were parsed across separate queries, cumulatively requiring a combination 
of twelve independent calls to the Streaming API. The pre-Brexit database was ultimately 
sampled to the 13 days leading up to the referendum vote, totaling 2,775,789 tweets―1,742,756 
of which are retweets. 
 
The partisan affiliation of users in this data set was identified based on the usage of hashtags 
clearly aligned to one of the referendum campaigns. The mean affiliation is only calculated for 
users that actively tweeted referendum hashtags. As such, @-mentioned or retweeted users are 
only identified as Leaver or Remainer if the user in question tweeted or retweeted a separate 
message with hashtags clearly aligned with one side of the campaign. This conservative 
approach renders most media outlets and high-profile accounts as neutral and has the added 
benefit of filtering out retweets or @-mentions intended as provocation or ironic remark; these 
messages are offset by the broader ideological orientation tweeted by the account, and users that 
have only sourced information or received @-mentions are classified as neutral for not having 
themselves tweeted any partisan hashtag. 
 
We further classified tweets that espoused nationalist versus cosmopolitan values, and populist 
versus economist values. To this end, we relied on a set of 10,000 tweets manually classified 
along the ideological polarities of Globalism vs Nationalism and Economism vs Populism to 
train a machine learning algorithm using text vectorization (Selivanov, 2016), an approach 
purposefully built for text analysis. For each ideological pair, the classifier returns a range of 
values from 0 (completely globalist) to 1 (completely nationalist), so that values from 0.45 to 
0.55 are somewhere in the middle of this scale and assumed to be relatively neutral (Bastos & 
Mercea, 2018). We rely on the second data set―the non-Brexit data set―to compare tweet 
decay in the Brexit data versus non-political, generic hashtags that also trended in 2016. The 
non-Brexit data set includes 45 hashtag and a random sample of one thousand tweets was 
rehydrated to verify if user accounts and tweets were still available in the platform. 
 
The third and last is the post-Brexit data set which was derived by querying a database of 100 
million Brexit-related tweets, starting in the period leading up to the referendum campaign and 
ending in October 2019. This database includes 43 months of Brexit-related messages. We take a 
sample without replacement of 50,000 tweets per month, an approach similar to the constructed 
week sampling employed in journalism studies that maximizes generalizability beyond 
consecutive days and is suitable for estimating content for a six-month period or longer (Riffe, 
Aust, & Lacy, 1993). The monthly sampling approach returned a data set of 2,150,000 tweets (of 
which 1,404,704 are retweets), subsequently rehydrated to estimate the fraction of deleted tweets 
and user accounts in the data for each of the 43 months that followed the referendum campaign. 
 
A computer script was written to programmatically query Twitter REST API for user accounts 
and tweet IDs (rehydration). These steps allowed us to calculate the tweet decay coefficient for 
Twitter data sets at scale. We relied on this program to validate the results on a range of hashtags 
with several thousand tweets posted in the same period of the official campaign of the UK EU 
membership referendum, which took place in the first half of 2016. For each hashtag, we take a 
random sample without replacement of one thousand tweets in the data set and query Twitter 
API to verify whether the message is still available and the account (by user ID) that sourced the 
content remains active. 
 
Finally, identifying temporal trends in the presence of anomalies is a non-trivial task for anomaly 
detection, so we relied on the Seasonal Hybrid ESD (S-H-ESD) algorithm to discover 
statistically meaningful anomalies in the input time series of deleted and active tweets (Vallis, 
Hochenbaum, Kejariwal, Rudis, & Tang, 2014). S-H-ESD employs time series decomposition 
and Generalized Extreme Studentized Deviate (ESD) to test for outliers. The algorithm supports 
long time series such as the one explored in this study and employs piecewise approximation to 
identify both positive and negative anomalies in input time series (point-in-time increase versus 
decrease in tweets), which is important as we are interested both in the upsurge and decline of 
the fraction of tweets deleted in the observed time period. 
Results 
We approached H1 by exploring the period of 13 days leading up to the referendum vote in June 
23, 2016. A total of 2,775,789 messages were tweeted by 792,663 users, thereby averaging 
around 3.5 messages per user. Social media activity presents a long-tailed distribution and 
Twitter is no exception to this: 169 users tweeted over 500 messages and 28 posted more than 
one thousand messages. The official campaign accounts @ivotestay and @ivoteleave posted 
15,928 and 11,647 tweets in this 13-day period, respectively, and since the referendum both 
accounts have been suspended by Twitter. Indeed, we manually checked the 100 most active user 
accounts and 37 are no longer active: 16 have been suspended and 21 no longer exist (deleted 
account). From the remaining 63 active accounts, 3 were recreated after the referendum and 2 
have been set to private. In short, only about half of the most active accounts in the referendum 
debate continue to operate publicly. 
 
This trend is not restricted to hyperactive users. We queried Twitter REST API and the web 
interface to check which user accounts remained active in October 2019, three years after the 
vote. For the universe of 792,663 users that tweeted the referendum between 12-24 June, 20% or 
155,157 accounts were no longer active. These numbers are consistent whether checking by 
username or user ID, with only 118 mismatches (false positive or negative) when querying 
Twitter REST API by usernames instead of user ID. Twitter REST API does not inform if the 
accounts have been deleted, blocked, suspended, removed, or set to private. We therefore 
checked the web interface of each of these accounts to identify accounts that have been 
suspended by Twitter. Twenty percent of the accounts that are no longer active have been 
blocked by Twitter (n=36,159). 
 
The figures are yet more dramatic when we inspect the share of messages that are no longer 
available on Twitter, whether on Enterprise, Search, or REST APIs, or via web interface. 
Twenty-two percent or 631,700 tweets are no longer available due to the removal of the seeding 
user and the consequences of the Terms of Service governing content authored by deleted 
accounts. Posts from deleted accounts are retrospectively removed from Twitter and generate 
orphaned data, but this number only accounts for messages that are no longer available due to the 
user account that posted the content no longer being active. We rehydrated the data to account 
for this difference, thereby also identifying messages that were actively deleted by users, as well 
as retweet cascades that disappeared due to the original seeding post no longer being available in 
the platform. 
 
One third of the nearly 3 million tweets posted in the period are no longer available (n=932,815), 
with only 1,842,974 tweets remaining available. In other words, 33% of the tweets that shaped 
the discussion about the referendum are no longer retrievable three years after the vote and 
nearly half of this universe of messages disappeared because the seeding account was removed, 
blocked, deleted, suspended, or set to private. Indeed, one-fifth of the tweets that are no longer 
available disappeared because the seeding account was suspended from Twitter. This figure 
(n=203,681) includes not only tweets authored by these accounts, but also intermediary points in 
retweet cascades that vanished because the user account was no longer available. Suspended 
accounts were particularly prolific: while less than 5% of users were suspended, these accounts 
posted nearly 10% of the entire conversation about the referendum on Twitter. 
 
Figure 1 unpacks the fraction of deleted tweets and accounts: around 20% of users (or 155,157 
out of 792,663) are no longer active and again 20% of this cohort of accounts have been blocked 
by Twitter (or 36,159 out of 155,157). It would be informative to know more about the 
remainder 118,998 accounts that are no longer active. These may be accounts that have been 
compromised, utilized in influence operations, or that violated the Twitter’s Terms of Service, 
but unfortunately only the information available in the API can be made public due to the 
constraints of their Privacy Policy (Twitter, 2019c). This is a considerable limitation, as this 
small cohort of accounts posted nearly 10% of the entire conversation about the referendum on 
Twitter. As such, it seems that this cohort of removed accounts may have sourced low-quality 
content both at speed and scale. The results are nonetheless consistent with hypothesis H1, as the 
fraction of deleted tweets is considerably higher than the average of 4% reported in the literature.  
 
 
Figure 1: (a) 33% of the tweets leading up to the referendum vote are no longer retrievable; (b) 20% of the user 
accounts that tweeted the referendum are no longer active 
Our second hypothesis states that partisan messages are likely to present higher decay compared 
with neutral messages. Both #voteleave and #voteremain account for a significant share of the 
hashtags in the data, with the former appearing in 15% of the tweets and the latter in just under 
10%. The hashtag #voteleave is however significantly more likely to appear in tweets that are no 
longer available. Indeed, 20% of the deleted messages espoused this term compared with the 
regular 10% for #voteremain. No other hashtag presents such a large difference between the 
frequency observed in the population of deleted tweets compared with the frequency observed in 
the entire population of messages. Indeed, the point difference observed for #voteleave is 
comparable to the point difference of the remainder 700 most popular hashtags combined 
(x=.064 for both groups). 
 
One important caveat is that the vote Leave campaign accounts for a larger share of the tweets 
due to the prevalence of popular Leave hashtags. We therefore controlled for the higher number 
of tweets and users associated with Leave, but Leave users continued to be identified as more 
likely to be deleted, blocked, or removed from Twitter. Similarly, the tweets posted by these 
accounts are considerably more likely to decay. Nearly 40% of the messages posted by Leavers 
are no longer available whereas the fraction of deleted tweets for Remainers is under 30%. 
Indeed, if we assign the hashtag #brexit to the Leave campaign, we find that more messages from 
the Leave campaign disappeared from Twitter than the entire universe of messages affiliated 
with the Remain campaign: 468,419 tweets disappeared from a total of 1,224,568 messages 
posted by Leavers, and 130,245 posts are no longer available from a universe of 438,359 
messages posted by Remainers. 
 
As reported in previous research (Bastos & Mercea, 2018), the overall sentiment during most of 
the campaign was decidedly nationalistic, with three quarters of messages having a nationalistic 
sentiment. Most messages tweeted in the period were additionally preoccupied with economic 
implications of the decision to leave the E.U. There are however significant differences in the 
ideological orientation of the Brexit debate when controlling for users and tweets that have since 
disappeared. While the debate is predominantly focused on economic issues, most of messages 
that are no longer available (n= 932,815) largely appeal to populist slogans (x̄=.52 and ?̃?=.50) 
compared with the subset of messages that remain active (x̄=.44 and x̃=.43). This substantial 
difference is again observed in the ideological polarity Globalism vs Nationalism. The debate is 
indeed predominantly nationalistic, but it is significantly more so in the subset of messages that 
are no longer available: x̄=.64 and x̃=.67, compared with x̄=.59 and ?̃?=.63 for the subset of 
messages that remained active. 
 
To further probe H2, we rehydrate a range of hashtags with several thousand tweets posted in the 
period of the official campaign of the UK EU Membership Referendum, which ran in the first 
half of 2016. For each hashtag, we take a random sample of one thousand tweets in the data set 
and query Twitter API to verify if the message is still available and whether the account (by user 
ID) that sourced the content remains active. A total of 45 hashtags were queried in 5 groups of 9 
hashtags for the Remain1 and the Leave2 campaigns, 9 non-partisan hashtags discussing the 
referendum3, 9 nonpolitical hashtags4 that trended in the period, and 9 hashtags dedicated to 
protest activism5 causes. 
 
Group 4 identified 15% as the deletion baseline for hashtagged tweets in 2016 (Q1=.10, x̄=.15, 
?̃?=.15, Q3=.19), with this baseline sharply increasing as the topic of the conversation became 
more contentious. Protest activism hashtags presented a tweet decay of nearly 30% for 
15maydebout and 44% for blacklivesmatter, a hashtag campaign notable for being targeted by 
the Russian IRA operations (Bastos & Farkas, 2019). Brexit related discussions also verge 
around 30% (Q1=.24, x̄=.28, ?̃?=.29, Q3=.32), a figure that is not too different from what was 
 
1 Group 1: betteroffin, bremain, leadnotleave, lovenotleave, moreincommon, strongerin, votein, voteremain, yes2eu 
2 Group 2: beleave, betteroffout, britainout, leaveeu, loveeuropeleaveeu, no2eu, notoeu, voteleave, voteout 
3 Group 3: brexit, brexitornot, antibrexit, euref, eureform, eurefresults, jocoxrip, lovelikejo, referendum  
4 Group 4: mozfest, nsmnss, rstats, agchat, cadrought, foodsystem, homegrown, phdchat, usaid 
5 Group 5: 15maydebout, 7mdebout, bruxellesdebout, globaldebout, nobillnobreak, nuitdebout, romadebout, 
blacklivesmatter, and lesvos. 
 
observed in openly partisan hashtags associated with the Remain campaign (Q1=.23, x̄=.30, 
?̃?=.26, Q3=.32). Openly partisan hashtags associated with the Leave campaign, however, present 
a worrying and much higher coefficient of tweet decay (Q1=.33, x̄=.42, ?̃?=.42, Q3=.50). 
 
Indeed, three quarters of the content hashtagged with #betteroffout has been removed from 
Twitter. More than half of the tweets hashtagged with #voteleave, the official campaign to leave 
the EU, is no longer available. Figure 2 unpacks the differences across classes of hashtags. The 
size of the line indicates the discrepancy between account deletion rate and tweet deletion rate. In 
other words, the longer the line, the higher the fraction of deleted tweets relative to the fraction 
of deleted accounts. This can be caused by users regretting and deleting the original post, or else 
changing their account to private, in which case the original tweet is no longer available even 
though the account remains operational. 
 
 
Figure 2: Green dots: fraction of deleted accounts (percentage points). Yellow dots: fraction of deleted tweets 
(percentage points). The tweet deletion rate for hashtags betteroffout and beleave are 74% and 65%, respectively. 
Vertical grey bar shows the mean deletion rate for this set of forty-five hashtags. 
These results are consistent with hypothesis H2, which stated that partisan messages were to 
present higher decay compared with neutral messages. We validate this analysis by parsing the 
hashtags featured in the pre-Brexit data set and calculate the deletion rate per tag. Tweets 
hashtagged with terms associated with the Leave campaign are considerably more likely to have 
been deleted. Indeed, the list of tags tweeted over 1 thousand times with a deletion rate of 40% or 
higher includes mostly Leave hashtags, with online a few terms not clearly aligned with either 
side of the campaign: voteleave, votein, leaveeu, ivoted, voteout, beleave, cameron, inorout, ukip, 
and eng. For this set of hashtags, most of the messages tweeted in the period leading up to the 
vote are no longer available (x̄=52%). 
 
Lastly, we probe hypothesis H3 by testing the extent to which tweet decay is dependent on the 
timeframe of the Brexit negotiations and deliberation. To this end, we queried a database of 100 
million Brexit-related tweets posted by users based in Britain. The database encompasses the 
official campaign period for the 2016 referendum campaign until October 2019 and includes 43 
months of Brexit-related messages. We take a sample without replacement of 50,000 tweets per 
month, therefore generating a data set of 2,150,000 tweets. We proceed by querying Twitter 
REST API to check whether users and tweets are still active in the platform. This approach 
allowed us to calculate a coefficient for tweet decay that is representative for each of the 43 
months that followed the referendum campaign. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the fraction of messages that remained active is constant throughout the 
period, while the ratio of deleted messages varies considerably and seems to follow contentious 
moments of the Brexit saga. There is considerable increase in tweet decay in the weeks leading 
up to the referendum vote―from 19% in April up to 33%, as discussed above. Tweet decay 
recedes after the ballot and resumes again as pressure mounts for triggering Article 50. This is 
when the monthly fraction of deleted tweets peaks from 27% to one-third in the last week. The 
fraction of deleted tweets stabilizes in the wake of triggering Article 50 and only escalates, albeit 
mildly, when Theresa May announces the Chequers Plan, after which the monthly fraction of 
deleted tweets is again around one-fifth. In the following months tweet decay decreases steadily. 
The fraction of deleted tweets only becomes similar to those reported in the literature after Boris 
Johnson becomes Prime Minister, when tweet decay is the lowest at 7%. 
 
 
Figure 3: Monthly deleted vs active Brexit-related tweets (log) from April 2016-October 2019 (N=2,150,000) 
These anomalies are promptly detected by the Seasonal Hybrid ESD (S-H-ESD) algorithm 
(Vallis et al., 2014). Anomalies are found in the series of active and deleted tweets on the date of 
the referendum and the triggering Article 50, which is unsurprising given the increase of activity 
reflecting these key dates in the Brexit calendar. There are nevertheless significant global 
anomalies in the series of deleted tweets that are not present in the series of active tweets. These 
can be pinpointed to the large volumes of tweets that disappeared after key dates. Indeed, a 
significant number of messages disappear three weeks after Article 50 was triggered, and again 
another significant upsurge in tweet decay is registered the day after the snap general election (8 
June 2017). None of above anomalies are registered in the regular series of tweets that remained 
active, which is consistent with the assumption that tweet decay is associated with politically 
contentious contexts (H3). In fact, most of the anomalies in the series of active tweets are 
registered in late 2019, when Boris Johnson becomes Prime Minister and Parliamentary 
Elections are called for 12 of December 2019. Figure 4 unpacks these differences, showing the 
temporal series of active and deleted tweets and the detected anomalies. 
 
 
Figure 4: Time series of active and deleted tweets with anomalies identified with by the S-H-ESD algorithm 
Conclusion 
The results presented in this study caution against the use of social platforms as a complement or 
extension to deliberative forums, as even the public record of social media interactions, or at 
least considerable portions of it, is subjected to being removed from public scrutiny. This is 
particularly problematic if one assumes social platforms may offer a substitute for deliberative 
forums of civic participation. From a theoretical point of view, indeed from a Habermasian 
perspective on public deliberation, the collective decision-making on issues of public concern 
seeks to resolve conflicts based on the quality of the argument and the evidence supporting it. 
The results reported in this study are largely at odds with these stipulations. While the volume of 
activity on social media may be directly linked to developments on the ground (Bastos, Mercea, 
& Charpentier, 2015), the results show that a significant portion of the political debate on Twitter 
is not designed for permanence. 
 
Ephemerality is perhaps an expected affordance of social media communication, but it is not an 
expected design of political communication and deliberation across social platforms. The 
disappearance of one third of the discussion underpinning a key event in contemporary politics 
indicates that the fraction of deleted tweets may be a proxy for manipulation and disinformation. 
Indeed, much of the deleted content was caused by Twitter actively blocking the user accounts, 
thereby suggesting that the Brexit debate may have been subjected to considerable volumes of 
low-quality information whose distribution often resorts to artificial manipulation and false 
amplification (Walker et al., 2019). In other words, while the ephemerality of social media posts 
may be a reasonable expectation, this poses considerable challenges for informed public 
deliberation around matters where the issue being deliberated on is constantly disappearing from 
public scrutiny. 
 
Unfortunately, the identification of removed content and user accounts entails computational 
routines that cannot be implemented in real time, as there are multiple triggers that may block or 
delete an account and post from social platforms. Influence operation may conceivably exploit 
these limitations by offloading problematic content that is removed from platforms before the 
relentless―though time consuming―news cycle has successfully corrected the narratives 
championed by highly volatile social media content. This process could be described as the 
involuntary but spontaneous gaslighting of social platforms: the low persistence and high 
ephemerality of social media posts are leveraged to transition from one contentious and 
unverified political frame to the next before mechanism for checking and correcting false 
information are in place.  
 
Influence operations can daisy chain multiple disinformation campaigns that are phased out and 
disappear as soon as rectifying information or alternative stories starts to emerge. The politics of 
deletion can thus be leveraged in propaganda campaigns centered around the firehose of 
falsehood model (Paul & Matthews, 2016), where a large number of messages are broadcast 
rapidly, repetitively, and continuously over multiple channels without commitment to 
consistency or accuracy (Bertolin, 2015). The high volume posting of social media messages can 
be effective because individuals are more likely to be persuaded if a story, however confusing, 
appears to have been reported repetitively and by multiple sources. Traditional 
counterpropaganda methods tend to be infective against this technique. Similarly, fact-checking 
social media posts that have disappeared is not technically possible and perhaps not desirable 
either.  
 
In other words, while social media content may be fundamentally ephemeral, the fraction of 
deleted tweets reported in this study was at times disturbingly high and prevented further 
analyses of the accounts that seeded the content, as once users are removed from the platform no 
further information can be gleaned from the account. The implications of observing such high 
decay in dynamic content at the center of political discussion certainly warrant further research. 
For one, it is important to establish the cutoff point after which political content is likely to 
disappear from social platforms. While previous studies show that decay is associated with time, 
our results show that political and especially contentious messages are more likely to disappear 
from the public record than nonpartisan conversations recorded in the same period. 
 
Further studies should examine the extent to which different forms of political discussion are 
equally likely to disappear from social platforms, which temporal patterns are indicative of 
survival, and whether decay is caused by manipulation and influence operations detected by and 
ultimately removed from social media by the platforms themselves. This may require research 
collaboration with social platforms, especially if the objective is to establish whether the decay in 
social media posts is associated with influence operations and low-quality content, which 
reportedly presents shorter shelf life compared with more organic content. 
 
Another important empirical question that could not be addressed in this study is determining the 
exact point in time when accounts and tweets sourcing political content are likely to start 
decaying. While Xu et al. (2013) have found a strong and inverse linear association between the 
fraction of deleted tweets and time (in one-minute increments), this may apply only to the corpus 
of bullying tweets studied by the authors. The extreme drop-off in deletion rate reported by the 
authors, along with the remarkable low ratio of deleted tweets at only 4%, are important 
indicators that social media decay likely differs across topics and may be substantively higher for 
conversations targeted by influence operations. In other words, one important empirical question 
that warrants further research is whether deletion rate is universally and inversely associated with 
time. 
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